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THE POTENTIAL OF CONFLICT-SENSITIVE 
EDUCATION APPROACHES IN FRAGILE 
COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF CURRICULUM 
FRAMEWORK REFORM AND YOUTH 
CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN SOMALIA
Marleen Renders and Neven Knezevic 
 
Education is a basic human right, as well as a precondition for 
peace, prosperity and justice to return to Somali citizens on a 
lasting basis.
—Cassanelli and Abdikadir 2008, 91
ABSTRACT
How can education services in fragile and conflict-affected settings sustain education 
results and help break the cyclical patterns of conflict that lead to massive reversals 
in development, including in education? This field note presents the case of the 
review of the curriculum framework in Somalia, a UNICEF-supported education 
intervention that intentionally engaged with the drivers of conflict. The note outlines 
how this mainstream education intervention, which has a widened focus on building 
youths’ civic participation, can help to build a capacity for peace at various levels 
(individual, group, and policy) in terms of substance and process. It also provides 
emerging results, limitations, and observations about the intervention. The field 
note concludes by offering some reflections on inclusive and relevant service delivery 
as a critical part of peace- and state-building in fragile settings.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 2000 and 2015, unprecedented progress was made in improving access 
to primary education across the world under the aegis of the Millennium 
Development Goals, as reflected in enrollment rates. Nevertheless, on the eve 
of the declaration of the 2015-2030 Sustainable Development Goals, 57 million 
children were still out of primary school, 50 percent of them living in fragile, 
conflict-affected areas. To achieve the objective that all these girls and boys 
complete a free, equitable, and quality primary education that leads to relevant 
and effective learning outcomes, education systems and policies will need to be 
able to adapt and respond within such contexts.
Somalia provides a powerful example of a context of conflict and protracted 
fragility, as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 2006). Key indicators of fragility include ongoing violence 
and a legacy of conflict; weak rule of law; a lack of effective, accountable, and 
inclusive institutions; poor economic inclusion and stability; and high exposure 
to shocks and stresses (climate-related, economic, social, and environmental). 
The population in these fragile settings tends to be very young: the median age 
in 2013 was 21 years, compared to the global median of 30. This is also the case 
in Somalia (United Nations Population Fund 2014).
How can we ensure that international development assistance in fragile and 
conflict-affected settings is able to break the cyclical pattern of conflict that leads 
to massive development reversals in countries such as Somalia, and support the 
achievement of sustainable results for children?
This field note describes how UNICEF engaged in a review of the primary 
school curriculum in Somalia with the aim of addressing factors that drive and 
perpetuate conflict in that nation. The curriculum review was based on a wide 
participatory process facilitated by youth, rather than on a narrowly conceived 
“technical” education intervention. In the context of an education system 
historically characterized by social exclusion, inequity, and underinvestment, 
young women and men from different districts and regions of Somalia took 
an active role in a key aspect of education policy-making. They demonstrated 
constructive citizenship and an ability to contribute to a more inclusive and 
relevant education for Somali children. This youth-facilitated consultation process 
and its relevance for peacebuilding through education interventions is the focus 
of this field note.
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The first part of the field note, which follows a description of the methodology, 
analyzes the relation between the state of the education system and the nature 
of the Somali state throughout its slow disintegration, eventual collapse, and 
subsequent efforts to rebuild. The second part outlines the intervention itself: its 
design, rationale, and implementation. The third part considers emerging results, 
observations, and limitations. The fourth and final part offers some reflections 
on how to deliver education services in fragile settings.
METHODOLOGY
The program discussed in this field note was part of UNICEF’s 2012-2016 
Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) program, an initiative active in 14 
countries that were working to improve the conflict sensitivity of their education 
programs and their relevance for peacebuilding. The PBEA program sought to 
learn how education programs should be designed and implemented so as not 
to cause or worsen conflict, and how such programs could actively contribute to 
building peace by addressing factors that cause violent conflict. The program’s 
desired outcomes included building a compendium of case studies, good practices, 
evidence, and reflections to inform future education program development.
Both authors of this field note were involved in the implementation of the youth-
facilitated consultation, albeit in different roles. Renders, the PBEA program 
manager for UNICEF Somalia, led the program design and provided training 
and continuous technical support to the implementing partner, with a focus on 
conflict-sensitive education programming and peacebuilding in conflict settings. 
She also provided overall technical and financial management oversight. Knezevic, 
the education and peacebuilding specialist at the UNICEF Regional Office for 
East and Southern Africa, or ESARO, provided quality assurance for the PBEA 
interventions in the ESARO region, including Somalia. He also supported data 
analysis, activity evaluations, and case studies and research conducted in countries 
across in the region.
The field note was conceptualized as a reflective exercise that discusses the 
intervention in the larger context of state-building. It was informed by an extensive 
literature review, with a focus on education, peacebuilding, and state-building 
in Somalia. The discussion includes specific field-level results and observations 
drawn from a case study led by Knezevic, which was partially facilitated by an 
external consultant and conducted independently by country-level PBEA program 
management in Somalia.
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Fieldwork for this case study was conducted during two visits to the cities of 
Bosaso and Galkayo in Somalia’s Puntland State, which took place during one 
week in September 2014. The data-gathering methods included conducting 
qualitative semi-structured interviews and structured remote interviews using 
guided-questioning techniques; analysis of quantitative survey data; and analysis 
of secondary documents, including program reports from the implementing 
partner and PBEA annual reports. Approximately 30 individuals participated 
in the case study, including local Somali youth and PBEA’s implementing partner 
staff. Additional data analysis included reviews of internal implementation reports 
from implementation partners and youth facilitators’ field diaries.
 
Education and Peace-/State-Building in Somalia
Scholarly publications on education in Somalia are scarce; however, those that 
exist are all univocal about the fact that the education sector in the country has 
not benefited from the commitment of funding or good governance it deserves 
and desperately needs—not only since the Somali state collapsed in 1991 as a 
result of the civil war, but also before. 
Below we outline a clear correlation between the nature of the Somali state and the 
state of education in the country. For most of its recent history, access to quality, 
relevant, inclusive, and conflict-sensitive education has been severely constrained. 
This has taken a heavy toll on Somali children’s access to education and their 
learning outcomes, and has limited the chance for an inclusive, representative, 
and legitimate form of state governance to emerge.
Education in Somalia up to the Civil War
Before Somalia became independent in 1960, different forms of education were 
practiced in the regions that would become Somalia. Abdi (1998) points out 
that, although far from perfect, traditional systems of learning and socialization 
equipped children with what they needed to survive and thrive in their 
environment: education—albeit informal—was a social endeavor that was owned 
by and relevant to communities’ values and needs (329; Abdinoor 2008, 44). 
In the late nineteenth century, two other forms of knowledge acquisition had 
started to take root. Sufi religious orders known as tariqa had started to spread 
currents of Islamic thought from Arab lands. At the same time, new forms of 
Western secular knowledge were starting to emerge throughout the Somali lands 
(Cassanelli and Abdikadir 2008, 92).
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The advent of colonial administration (British in the north, Italian in the south) 
introduced formal Western schooling to the Somalis. It had only limited ambition 
in both purpose and scope: it was primarily aimed at training people to fill 
the lower ranks of the colonial administrative apparatus. At the time of Somali 
independence, the British protectorate in the north had only 2,339 students 
enrolled in primary school; in the southern regions the Italian Trusteeship 
Administration, under UN oversight, had expanded the number of learners to 
16,000 (Cassanelli and Abdikadir 2008, 94).
In the discourse of the Somali nationalist liberation movements and government 
at the time of independence, education featured prominently as the nation’s 
avenue to socioeconomic advancement (Abdi 1998, 233). This said, nothing much 
changed initially in terms of expanding access to education, as the fledgling 
government quickly fell prey to stark intra-elite competition for the power and 
resources associated with state control. The political actors competed along clan 
lines (Renders 2012).
In 1969, a military coup ended civilian rule and ushered in an era of Somali 
socialism under General Siyad Barre. In the first decade under military rule, 
notable progress was made in education, including the development of an official 
script for the Somali language in 1972 and two major literacy campaigns—an 
urban campaign in 1973 and a similar effort as part of the Rural Development 
Campaign in 1974. The government nationalized all existing schools and expanded 
education coverage, and also made education compulsory—and free—for children 
between six and fourteen years old. School enrollment had risen sharply by the 
mid-1970s, and the literacy rate went from 5 percent to 55 percent in a short 
period of time (Laitin and Samatar 1987).
However, the drive for development through education was quickly abandoned 
and replaced by other priorities. The Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977-1978, 
which occurred against a backdrop of Cold War superpower rivalry in the region, 
dramatically depleted public resources. It proved to be the starting point of a 
long period of gradual state disintegration. The Barre regime’s circle of actors, 
who had power and control over resources, became smaller and smaller, with 
politics and power struggles once more waged along clan lines (Renders 2012). 
Corruption and violence flourished, which affected access to and quality of all 
social services, including education. The budget for education remained woefully 
inadequate, reaching an all-time low by 1985. Teachers started leaving en masse 
to pursue better opportunities at home and abroad. 
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The gross enrollment ratio for 4- to 23-year-olds was 14 percent in 1980; by 1988 
it had dropped to 7 percent (UNESCO 1991). The all-encompassing violence of 
the 1991-1993 civil war finished off whatever was left in Somalia in terms of an 
education system or infrastructure. As warlords who commanded faction militia 
viciously competed for power and control over economic assets, the schools and 
all other infrastructure were completely destroyed, particularly in the south-
central region of Somalia. With the exception of Somaliland, which struggled 
to maintain some level of education services, Somalia’s children virtually went 
without formal schooling for two years (Williams and Cummings 2015, 423).
The civil war period also painfully brought to the fore the fact that young people 
in Somalia had become instruments of power struggles in which they had little 
stake. While young women were all but invisible, scores of young men were 
recruited into the warlord-led clan militia that would become a destabilizing 
factor for years to come (Mohamed-Abdi 2001-2002). The extreme violence meted 
out by the clan militia, and armed young men in general, instilled fear in the 
population and resulted in a negative image of youth in Somali society (War-torn 
Societies Project 1998, 20).
Somali Education in a Context of Statelessness
Throughout 1993, the level of violence in Somalia started to subside. Although the 
militia and warlords continued their struggle over physical resources and spheres 
of influence, fighting was no longer constant or ubiquitous. Under the auspices of 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I; later UNOSOM II), the 
international troops of the Unified Task Force (known as UNITAF) were deployed 
to oversee (and later enforce) a ceasefire, to create conditions that would allow 
humanitarian aid to be delivered, and, ultimately, to begin reconstructing the 
Somali state. The endeavor, however, was not a success, nor were many subsequent 
attempts to restore order from above. During that time, a number of Somali 
educators had launched small educational projects with assistance from a few 
NGOs and international agencies (notably UNICEF and UNESCO). However, in 
the absence of a national authority to oversee educational planning and given the 
limited capacity of local actors to mobilize the resources and expertise needed, 
most of what was built up collapsed immediately after UNOSOM II withdrew 
in 1995 (Cassanelli and Abdikadir 2008, 105).
In Somalia’s south-central region, and to a large extent in Puntland and Somaliland, 
what remained active were largely Arab charities, private-sector initiatives, 
and initiatives steered by individual communities. However, this community 
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participation required some time to take shape, as parents still expected the state 
to take responsibility for their children’s formal education, despite the military 
regime’s abysmal level of achievement (Abdinoor 2008, 50). As the prospect of a 
state apparatus taking shape remained obviously distant, parents and communities 
started to take part in school administration, to take an interest in what was 
taught in the schools, and to contribute financially to their children’s education. 
Community involvement was only possible, however, where people trusted the 
education their children were receiving and did not have fears about the child’s 
religion or culture (52).
Notable progress was made over the years in Somaliland, the northwestern region 
of Somalia that had declared independence in 1991, and in Puntland State, which 
had become a political entity (although not independent) in 1998. Both benefitted 
from relative peace, greater security, and emerging administrations that were 
gradually rebuilding their education services. Some support from international 
agencies and NGOs had also started flowing in. In the central and southern 
regions, the situation was more unsettled politically and militarily, and therefore 
more difficult. Nevertheless, private initiatives flourished. Although they were 
overwhelmingly located in urban areas such as Mogadishu, schools that had been 
set up locally started to come together under so-called education umbrellas, many 
of which were funded by Arab foundations and other interests. Somalia’s Formal 
Private Education Network, which was formed in 1999, implemented a common 
curriculum and examination system for its 150 member schools (Cassanelli and 
Abdikadir 2008, 107).
From the end of the 1990s, when the generalized violence that had characterized 
the 1991-1993 civil war had subsided, some gains were made, despite the limited 
support the education sector received from the international community. The 
2005-2007 UNICEF primary school survey found a gross enrollment rate of 27.9 
percent (21.1 percent for girls; UNICEF 2006). It should be emphasized, however, 
that rates in the southern and central regions were much lower, especially outside 
the urban areas, with a gross enrollment rate below 20 percent and a net rate 
of about 7 percent (Ministry of Education and Higher Education 2015). This 
demonstrates the ongoing negative impact that conflict, insecurity, and weak 
governance in the south-central region had on children’s education. Despite the 
fact that education umbrellas such as the Formal Private Education Network 
helped to some extent to fill the gap caused by the absence of an effective and 
legitimate government, education in Somalia remained disjointed and inequitable 
and suffered from compromised access and quality. As pointed out by the 
Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute of Policy Studies in its 2015 assessment of 
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educational challenges in Somalia, one key cause of this state of education was 
the large number of different education curricula used across schools—the study 
mentions ten (Hussein 2015).
State-Building and the Education Sector in Somalia
As noted above, by 2000, the northern regions of Somalia that had imploded in 
1991 had evolved toward a fairly stable political arrangement: in both Somaliland 
and Puntland State, peace deals between local clans and their militia were followed 
by a process in which fledgling state administrations gradually emerged (Renders 
2012). Having become stronger and more established over time, both Somaliland 
(which has held several general elections since 1997) and Puntland saw expanding 
administrative systems. Their respective political arrangements reflected the 
inclusion of major clans, which was a prerequisite for the popular legitimacy 
of these local states. However, this did not automatically translate into effective 
or accountable governance. Their administrative system and control functions 
systems such as parliamentary oversight remained weak, and budgets were 
limited, including for education. As a result of the improved stability, however, 
international agencies started rebuilding the education systems, although to a 
limited extent.
Conversely, the central and southern regions remained locked in a situation of de 
facto statelessness for much longer. Transitional governments (the first one was 
established in 2000 and was known as the Arta government) failed to establish 
a meaningful degree of influence or control over any portion of territory. In 
2007, a UN-mandated African Union Peacekeeping force known as AMISOM 
commenced a military campaign in response to the rise of the Islamic militia 
group Harakaat al-Shabaab al Mujahidiin (HSM). In 2012, Somalia adopted a new 
federal constitution, formed a new parliament, and selected a president under the 
auspices of a newly established Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). However, 
the situation in Somalia remained fragile. The political instability was marked 
by inter-clan conflict and the continued presence of HSM, which obstructed the 
government’s ability to assert its authority and deliver services across its territory 
(United Nations Security Council 2014).
In 2013, in response to this fragile context, the UN, major donors, and the FGS 
engaged in the New Deal process and adopted its instruments to frame policy. 
A compact was agreed to by the national and international stakeholders, who 
were guided by the principles of the New Deal. They established a single overall 
framework for advancing peacebuilding, state-building, and development over 
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a three-year period (2014-2016).1 International partners committed to support 
implementation of the New Deal compact around the five peacebuilding and 
state-building goals: inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, 
and revenue and basic services. The “basic services” pillar of the compact outlined 
how basic services needed to contribute to state-building, as increasing access to 
services (including education) in combination with transparent and accountable 
public finance systems would help increase trust in Somalia’s public institutions. 
This in turn would enhance the government’s legitimacy (Federal Republic of 
Somalia 2013).
Fronted by the FGS under the New Deal compact, the programs of the international 
agencies and NGOs started to re-engage with the country’s education systems 
and policies—not only in Somaliland and Puntland State but at the federal level—
which in practice covered the central and southern regions. 
One major focus of this effort was curriculum framework reform, which was 
identified as a necessary step in addressing education access and quality across 
the country. The larger context of conflict, however, could not be ignored, as an 
education curriculum can itself be a source of conflict, due to contested content 
or the way it is taught (Smith 2010). Given that three education ministries were 
operating completely independently—the federal, Puntland, and Somaliland 
ministries—the curriculum had to be flexible to avoid conflict and “portable” 
to ensure that any diplomas and certificates issued were compatible across the 
country.
Curriculum Framework Reform as an Inroad to Peacebuilding
How can education programming address the factors that drive fragility and 
conflict? Until quite recently, this question was not asked. Novelli, Lopes Cardozo, 
and Smith (2015) point to the influence and prominence of a “security-first” 
agenda in Somalia. In this approach to peacebuilding, the first priority is to stop 
the fighting and then establish democracy—for example, by holding elections. 
The assumption is that foreign investment will follow and will create economic 
growth, which will then benefit the entire population through increased wealth 
and improved services. However, without addressing the factors that led to the 
conflict in the first place—marginalization, exclusion, inequity—there is a real 
1 The New Deal was signed at the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held on November 30, 
2011, in Busan, Korea. Somalia is one of the signatories. Through the New Deal, development partners commit 
to support nationally owned and led development plans and provide more effective aid in fragile situations. 
Governments and development partners commit to pursuing the five peacebuilding and state-building goals.
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possibility that such state “reconstruction” will in fact contain the seeds of renewed 
conflict.
At the same time, education practitioners typically have a predominantly 
reductionist and “technical” view of education that either takes peacebuilding 
for granted (“people will be smarter and richer, so they will be less inclined to 
start conflicts or wars”) or is equated with peace education—that is, changing 
people’s minds and behavior one by one. However, without addressing structural 
weaknesses within the education sector—governance, access, quality—education 
will not necessarily contribute to peace. In fact, unintentionally replicating 
patterns of exclusion through education can help to perpetuate a conflict or even 
spark a new one (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004; Smith and Vaux 2003).
Novelli et al. (2015) respond to this by taking the position that sustainable 
peacebuilding is based on societal transformation. They argue that the social 
sectors, including education, can play a crucial role in this transformation 
through four remedies, which they call the four Rs: redistribution, recognition, 
representation, and reconciliation. Redistribution refers to the need to address 
the unequal distribution of educational resources and lack of equal educational 
opportunities. Recognition entails respecting differences and dealing with status 
inequalities that socially or culturally exclude people based on ethnic, linguistic, 
racial, gender, or other identities. Representation refers to the imperative to ensure 
participation, while reconciliation points to remedies aimed at dealing with the 
past and restoring trust—horizontally, between groups, and vertically—between 
group members and authorities.
In Somalia, UNICEF sought to adopt the concept of education as an inroad for 
social transformation and sustainable peacebuilding. Its global PBEA program 
covered 14 countries directly and dozens more indirectly across East Asia and the 
Pacific, South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, 
and West and Central Africa. PBEA interventions aimed to strengthen education 
policies and peacebuilding practices across four areas: increased inclusion of 
education in peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies; increased institutional 
capacity to support conflict-sensitive education; increased capacity of children, 
parents, teachers, and other duty bearers to prevent, reduce, and cope with conflict 
and promote peace; and increased access to quality and relevant conflict-sensitive 
education that contributes to peace. The following section outlines the program’s 
involvement in the process of curriculum reform in Somalia.
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Drivers of Fragility and Conflict in Somalia
Any intervention that aims to deal with drivers of fragility, including conflict, 
must be designed in accordance with the specific context in which it will be 
implemented. UNICEF commissioned the Post-war Reconstruction and 
Development Unit at the University of York to implement a conflict, peace, and 
situation analysis, which involved a wide cross-section of the population. The 
analysis was to explore the links between education and conflict, as well as the 
different issues, actors, and dynamics involved in Somaliland, Puntland State, and 
the central and southern regions of Somalia. Its aim was to ensure that education 
interventions were designed to address the drivers of fragility and conflict and 
contribute to peacebuilding, rather than inadvertently contributing to the sorts 
of pressures described by Novelli et al. (2015).
UNICEF proceeded to design its education intervention to engage with three 
key drivers, as voiced by the communities involved in the research (Barakat et 
al. 2014):
1. The economic, political, and social marginalization of youth resulted 
in their unemployment, recruitment into armed groups, emigration, 
involvement in crime, and a general loss of hope. What was first a Somali 
economy controlled by a limited number of political actors further 
declined into several war economies in which youth could easily be forced 
into coping strategies that put them at risk. Options for constructive 
civic and social participation were limited, especially for young people.
2. A loss of positive traditional values and the emergence of a culture of 
violence reflected that traditional ways of governing relations between 
groups and between individuals (e.g., regarding the sharing of natural 
resources, mutual assistance systems, conflict-management systems) were 
under severe pressure.
3. Weak education-sector management and governance systems reflected 
broader governance challenges. Few Somali children had access to 
education (girls in particular), and the infrastructure, learning materials, 
and teachers were underfunded. In the absence of effective government 
structures, the education system was dramatically underdeveloped, which 
in turn amplified the economic marginalization of youth and reproduced 
the political economy dynamics that underpinned drivers of fragility 
and conflict.
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These drivers are interlinked and highlight the system of exclusion and inequities 
that have come to underlie education, governance of the education sector, and 
overall governance in the Somali context.
Program Design
How could those striving to improve education in Somalia engage with identified 
conflict drivers, using the curriculum framework review as a point of entry? 
Curriculum framework reforms were planned in the three constituencies—the 
central and southern regions, Puntland State, and Somaliland—supported in part 
by the European Commission through the Somali-Wide Education Synergies 
program; all were about to start or were in their first phase in 2013. Technical 
assistance for the curriculum reform was provided by the international NGO, 
Africa Educational Trust (AET).
While curriculum reform usually is a process that involves a range of education 
professionals and ministry of education (MoE) staff, the PBEA program 
introduced a consultative component. The consultation was to involve a wide 
range of stakeholders and be facilitated by young women and men. Stakeholders 
included parents, youth both in and out of school, women’s groups, local business 
owners, local elders and religious leaders, disabled people, local teachers and 
head teachers, local authorities, and NGOs. At the same time, urban and rural 
livelihood groups—pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, coastal communities, and urban 
dwellers—were represented. The consultations were held across the country in 
order to reach people from the different clans and sub-clans. UNICEF and AET 
teamed up and set a goal of promoting education that would be responsive to local 
and national needs and aspirations. It would be locally owned, and the curriculum 
framework would ensure that it was academically portable and transferable by 
creating a unified, competency-based curriculum. As Smith points out (2010), a 
competency-based curriculum moves the focus away from contested histories and 
ideology, and thus eliminates the curriculum as a source of conflict. Moreover, 
the curriculum reform process was designed to address the specific conflict 
drivers and issues related to state-building. It was informed by lessons related to 
promoting inclusive and participatory governance systems that support bottom-up 
state-building processes, and thus helped to address the legacies of authoritarian 
or top-down regimes.2
2 For example, see Chopra (1999, 2002) and United Nations Development Programme (1997). On regime 
types, see Goodin and Klingemann (1996) and Kaveli Holsti (1997).
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The process aimed to create positive change at the individual level for the 
participants and at a broader sociopolitical level:
• Young men and women facilitating the community consultations were 
to be equipped with the necessary technical skills and the capacity to 
work together in a constructive way, and to appreciate diversity and 
different viewpoints. This would enhance both their employability and 
their potential as advocates for nonviolent ways to deal with conflict in 
their communities.
• These young men and women would contribute to a national education 
policy-making process, and be seen doing so by their communities, the 
wider public, and the government. This was done to enhance the young 
people’s sense of constructive citizenship and—in wider society and 
vis-à-vis the government—the notion that young people can contribute 
something constructive and valuable to decision-making processes and 
thus must be involved.
• Consultative community dialogues that informed national curriculum 
frameworks were held to help strengthen state-society relations by 
empowering local communities and giving them voice in a national 
decision-making process that directly affected their households.
• Seeking inputs from a wide range of stakeholders would result in a 
curriculum that reflected the needs of these stakeholders, one they could 
relate to, which would make it more relevant and less likely to reinforce 
inequity and exclusion.
 
AET and UNICEF embarked on an intensive advocacy process vis-à-vis Somalia’s 
education ministries and other education stakeholders in order to show the value 
of a more extended, more inclusive process that would promote a quality, relevant, 
and inclusive education. Once initial reluctance had been overcome, the ministries 
committed to the way forward.
Youth-Led Consultations to Inform the Curriculum Framework Reform
Facilitated by an international curriculum expert who collaborated with the AET 
team, the consultations sought input from the participants as to which competencies 
and values learners should acquire in primary school. The process did not engage 
explicitly with participants’ different views about these competencies and values, 
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focusing instead on what connected people through their engagement with the 
curriculum that their children could use to prepare for adult life.
In a first round of consultations, the wide range of participants was asked to 
contribute their ideas about what positive values, competencies, skills, and 
knowledge should go into the future curriculum and form the basis of what 
educated Somalis would learn in generations to come. The intervention was 
designed to help curriculum writers at the MoE incorporate feedback from the 
groups into the draft curriculum framework, and they incorporated the data 
collected in their work. A draft was then presented to the stakeholder groups, and a 
second round of consultation helped validate the draft curriculum framework. The 
consultation involved 248 young people (96 women and 152 men) as facilitators, 
with a total of 5,863 respondents participating in two rounds of consultation in 
communities across Somalia.
Selection of Youth Facilitators
Three sets of criteria were used to select the youth who participated in the 
community consultations: literacy, location, and acceptability. Adherence to these 
criteria was determined by local MoE officials and leaders of the communities in 
which the consultations were to occur. 
Youth facilitators were first required to have reading and writing skills, as the 
assignment involved reading documents and recording their discussions as 
community members. This meant in effect that university students, secondary 
school graduates, or secondary school students in their final year were selected 
to participate. 
Location was also critical in choosing participants, as the project sought to cover 
all geographic areas of the regions concerned. Youth facilitators were recruited 
to help gain access to and facilitate a level of trust in communities that might be 
reluctant to participate without local facilitators. The goal of reaching all areas 
was not achieved, due to security risks in some rural areas controlled by HSM. 
The final criterion was that the youth selected were acceptable to the local 
communities. This was achieved by involving community leaders in the selection 
process. This criterion facilitated trust while also helping to navigate local cultural 
barriers and clan dynamics, which ensured that communities would participate 
constructively in the consultation process. 
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To the extent possible, the youth participants came from the communities where 
the consultations took place, and thus were seen not as outsiders but as local 
sons and daughters who had an appreciation for the local environment and their 
community’s sensitivities.
Training Youth to Lead Community Consultations
Following the selection of the youth participants and the development and piloting 
of data-collection tools, the first batch of youth (56 percent males and 44 percent 
females) was trained jointly by AET and representatives of the MoE. The youth were 
introduced to the program’s rationale and then trained in interview techniques, 
ethics, and data recording. This “trainer-of-trainers” method was expected to 
allow AET to reach and train youth in the remote areas of the three sub-national 
entities of Somalia where direct access was more difficult for an international 
NGO. The rationale behind the training was to provide youth facilitators with 
the competencies necessary to conduct curriculum consultations, particularly 
the ability to plan and use data-collection tools. This entailed their acquiring 
skills in planning, cooperation, coordination, representation, decision-making, 
and problem-solving, all of which they could use during the consultations and 
also in their everyday lives.
Consultations and Drafting the Framework
The community-level consultations began in early August 2014 in Puntland State 
and the south-central region of Somalia. In preparing a first draft of the curriculum 
framework, the writers on the technical committees used input from the public 
consultations. To ensure a clear connection between the consultations and the 
draft frameworks, the process was supported by the international curriculum 
expert who had facilitated the consultations. Upon completion of the first draft, 
the youth involved in the first round of consultations were trained again, this 
time to enable them to share the draft with their communities and to receive the 
communities’ feedback. They were equipped with skills to validate the consultation 
findings and report on key education themes (access and retention, relevance, 
teaching and learning environment, teacher education and development, school 
governance, and stakeholder roles). The training included developing skills to 
make presentations, do group work, facilitate, and solve problems. It involved 
rehearsals—an approach that gave the participants a “real-life” experience to 
prepare them for managing complex situations in the field. The curriculum 
framework writers employed the new data to finalize the final drafts, which were 
presented at public meetings in the capitals of Somaliland and Puntland State, 
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and in Mogadishu, the federal capital. Some youth facilitators were present and 
the event was covered widely in the local media.
Challenges That Had to Be Overcome
As would be expected in a context like Somalia, the youth-led curriculum 
consultations encountered a number of challenges that are worth reviewing briefly.
Enabling an Inclusive Community-Based Approach
Writing the revised curriculum framework based on the wide-ranging consultations 
was a multi-stakeholder endeavor, and it came with considerable transaction 
costs in terms of getting stakeholders on board and coordinating among them. 
The setup required a high degree of flexibility in the implementation schedule. 
For example, timelines were repeatedly adapted to accommodate the different 
MoE priorities in the various implementation zones. However, even when this 
caused delays, it was deemed necessary in order to foster increased government 
ownership of the process, which required engaging the critical stakeholders in 
all stages of the implementation.
Security and Logistics
The consultation process encountered a host of security and logistics issues due 
to the prevalent situation in Somalia. Some areas with considerable HSM activity 
or ongoing AMISOM military operations, mainly the southern regions, could 
not be accessed. Sometimes access was complicated by the simple lack of regular 
transport to distant areas. Reaching these remote areas made the consultation 
more inclusive, thus the transportation challenge was willingly taken on.
Interacting with Religious Authorities
In a number of cases, community religious leaders stated initially that issues 
related to values belonged to their domain of authority, not that of the curriculum 
framework. Evidence drawn from the youth facilitators’ field journals indicates 
that, for the most part, the young people were able to overcome such resistance 
through dialogue. They noted further that the community consultations reviewed 
curriculum matters that did not concern religion directly, and that the religious 
leaders, as key figures in society, were invited to express their views on all 
curriculum issues.
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Conflict Sensitivity
The youth facilitators impressed upon the communities that the consultation 
represented an inclusive, impartial contribution to developing an appropriate 
education that would benefit all. The aim of the consultation was to look for what 
connected people rather than for what divided them. By supporting such sincere 
consultation, the PBEA program managed to steer clear of a “hearts and minds” 
approach, where one group must be convinced to join the position of the group 
that reaches out. Rather than seeking to change people’s opinions, positions, or 
convictions, the process looked for common ground. 
EMERGING RESULTS, OBSERVATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
Results
The intervention addressed conflict drivers at different levels in order to achieve 
and sustain a positive impact. Changes were envisaged at both the individual 
and structural level, as those made only at the individual level without links to 
the sociopolitical level would not be able to influence conflict drivers. Moreover, 
peacebuilding interventions that fail to engage with the key actors who have 
the power to change things—for better or worse—are likely to have a negligible 
impact. This is well illustrated by the Reflecting on Peace Practice matrix seen 
in Figure 1 (CDA 2009, 11).
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Figure 1: The “Reflecting on Peace Practice” Matrix
Anecdotal evidence collected for the qualitative case study that was based on field 
observations and participant feedback (Knezevic and Smith 2015) is described 
below.
Changes at the Individual Level: Skills, Behavior, Relationships
The youth applied a range of soft skills—patience, tolerance, commitment, 
and drive—with considerable success. The extent to which they increased their 
management and leadership competencies is best demonstrated by the fact that 
they successfully implemented their consultations with community members 
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Two illustr tive examples 
Following are two examples of how Theories of Change and program theories have been 
identified and tested.  
Community Dispute Resol tion program in Liberia
A large international NGO received donor funding, in the wake of the 14-year civil war in 
Liberia, t  develop Community Peace Councils (CPCs), a community-based mechanism for 
resolving a range of disputes, with an explicitly inter-ethnic approach. The CPCs were also 
designed to promote greater democratic participation through leadership development. An 
evaluation team first identified the underlying Theories of Change and program assumptions 
mainly by interviewing local and international staff members.  The evaluation revealed the 
following underlying Theories of Change: 
SOURCE: CDA (2009)
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in often challenging environments. Another clear achievement is their ability 
to help the youth who participated as facilitators to develop agency, which will 
help prepare them for constructive leadership roles in society. The consultations 
often brought together community members with very different views, and the 
youth-led discussions helped the participants find common understanding and 
accept differing views.
Sociopolitical Change: Public Opinion and Social Norms
The notion of a consultative process led by youth—and the youth facilitators 
themselves—were welcomed by the communities. Youth facilitators, both men 
and women, were met with a high level of collaboration from their interlocutors. 
Including youth in a social and governmental decision-making processes reflects 
a degree of willingness on the part of community leaders (including religious 
leaders) and local authorities to allow young people to inhabit this space. This 
success can be built on in subsequent education policy processes.
Institutional Change: Governance Reform
Interviews conducted following the activity and subsequent discussions with 
participants indicated that MoE officials who participated in the pilot—although 
initially reluctant—eventually became more supportive and provided support to 
ensure that the youth facilitators were able to take up their role. Education officials 
also incorporated findings from the youth-led consultations in the national 
education curriculum framework, which means that the peacebuilding process 
applied via the youth-led community consultations offered many traditionally 
excluded groups an opportunity to contribute to a national development process. 
This was the first time most community members had such an opportunity. While 
the intervention was primarily geared toward issues related to youth alienation 
and related risks of violence, the broader community participation it engendered 
should not be understated. 
Many of the communities where consultations took place experience high rates of 
deprivation and vulnerability across a range of indicators. The curriculum review 
process introduced an approach that has the potential to address historic legacies 
of authoritarian national governments and top-down governance systems, which 
are often implicated in the failure of the Somali state in 1991 and the chronic 
conflict and fragility that have dominated the country since then. The nature of 
the consultations appears to have given communities a sense of ownership of 
the curriculum frameworks, which balance sub-national regional dynamics by 
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focusing on broadly acceptable competencies that can be used across the entire 
country.
Structural Change
The youth-led consultations contributed to a more relevant curriculum, a term 
that is often misunderstood, even though it is a critical component of educational 
frameworks that promote social inclusion and equity (Epstein 2010). In this regard, 
effective “relevance strategies” aim to address curriculum issues that exclude 
“people from the labour market and alienate particular groups . . . from the broader 
society” (6). Consulting with 5,863 Somalis from very different socioeconomic 
backgrounds enabled a diverse range of livelihood groups to offer their views 
on how the national curriculum framework could be strengthened to support 
future generations of Somali children and adolescents—not just a small group 
but a large and diverse one.
REFLECTIONS ON EDUCATION AND PEACE-/STATE-BUILDING IN 
SOMALIA
Can education as a social service contribute to sustainable peacebuilding? Novelli 
et al. (2015) believe it can—provided that education engages with issues of social 
justice reflected in the four Rs: redistribution, recognition, representation, and 
reconciliation. This includes restoring horizontal trust among groups and vertical 
trust between group members and authorities.
The PBEA’s engagement with curriculum framework reform in Somalia aimed 
to address these issues of social justice throughout the intervention, as described 
above. Limitations of course remain, as the process was not perfect; for one thing, 
not all areas could be reached. The new curriculum framework alone will not 
address the persistently low gross enrollment rates, which are caused by a range 
of factors that impede access to education. Further interventions in the wider 
education sector will be needed to improve access. Moreover, one consultative 
policy process led by young people will not create a sustainable shift in the political 
modus operandi that helps to maintain a status quo of exclusion and inequity. 
However, the PBEA program has shown that superseding the narrow technical 
view of education with issues of social justice is possible. Stakeholders in the 
intervention have embraced this aspect of the PBEA program, which can be 
expanded to other education interventions.
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The intervention was able to engage with conflict drivers in the process of 
addressing education policy. Arguably, it is not only possible for education 
interventions to engage with conflict drivers—it is necessary. In a context of 
fragility, like that in Somalia, education outcomes are consistently undermined 
by the fallout from conflict, ongoing and renewed. If education interventions are 
designed without taking into account and engaging with the context in which 
they are implemented, they likely will undermine their own efforts.
The international community has not yet fully come to terms with this fact, 
or with the role social services play in building sustainable peace. Notably, the 
New Deal document and the Compact for Somalia (and, consequently, the UN 
Integrated Strategic Framework that supported their implementation) ostensibly 
still view access to services largely as a peace dividend that will become available 
to the population once peace and security have been established. According to 
this approach, access to social services in these areas will in turn contribute to 
the legitimacy of the government.
However, as has become clear from this case study, social services, including 
education, may have a larger and more critical role to play in dealing with factors 
of fragility and in building sustainable peace. Therefore, it is necessary to take on 
the challenge of assessing and re-evaluating current education responses in fragile 
contexts. If the kind of extended education responses that are often prevalent in 
long-term emergency contexts are adapted to address conflict drivers and factors 
of fragility, they will stand a better chance of achieving sustainable results that 
are not reversed by recurrent cycles of conflict.
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